Questions and Answers
Regarding the Department’s Final Title IX Rule

The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights, through its new Outreach, Prevention, Education and Non-discrimination (OPEN) Center, issues the following technical assistance document to support institutions with meeting their obligations under the Title IX Rule, which was announced on May 6, 2020, and which became effective on August 14, 2020. Many of the questions were derived from questions posed to the OPEN center through e-mail.

OCR may periodically release additional Question and Answer documents addressing the Title IX Rule.

All references and citations are to the unofficial version of the Title IX Rule, which is available here. A link to the official version of the Rule published in the Federal Register is here.

Disclaimer: Other than statutory and regulatory requirements included in the document, the contents of this guidance do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This document is intended only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.

Effective Date of the Final Rule

Question 1: Can you please clarify whether the new Title IX rules that went into effect on August 14, 2020, will be applied retroactively?

Answer 1: The Title IX Rule will not be enforced retroactively. In the Preamble to the Rule at page 127, the Department states unambiguously that the Department will not enforce these final regulations retroactively. The Department also notes, in footnote 290 of the Rule, the general principle that:

Federal agencies authorized by statute to promulgate rules may only create rules with retroactive effect where the authorizing statute has expressly granted such authority. See 5 U.S.C. 551 (referring to a “rule” as agency action with “future effects” in the Administrative Procedure Act); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“Retroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.”).

[OCR-000121]
Consistent with the Department’s statements in the preamble to the Title IX Rule regarding non-retroactivity, the Rule does not apply to schools’ responses to sexual harassment that allegedly occurred prior to August 14, 2020. The Department will only enforce the Rule as to sexual harassment that allegedly occurred on or after August 14, 2020. With respect to sexual harassment that allegedly occurred prior to August 14, 2020, OCR will judge the school’s Title IX compliance against the Title IX statute and the Title IX regulations in place at the time that the alleged sexual harassment occurred. In other words, the Rule governs how schools must respond to sexual harassment that allegedly occurs on or after August 14, 2020.

**Title IX Coordinator and Other Personnel Issues**

**Question 2:** Does the Title IX Rule specify whether each recipient must have a Title IX Coordinator, or is each school required to have a separate Title IX Coordinator, or both?

**Answer 2:** The Title IX Rule states in § 106.8(a): “Each recipient must designate and authorize at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with its responsibilities under this part, which employee must be referred to as the ‘‘Title IX Coordinator.’’” (emphasis added).

**Question 3:** The Title IX Rule allows schools to continue to address misconduct that does not meet the definition of sexual harassment. Can Title IX personnel still review these complaints, and follow procedures similar to those allegations that do meet the definition of sexual harassment?

**Answer 3:** Yes. The Title IX Rule does not preclude a recipient from using the same Title IX personnel (including the Title IX Coordinator, who must be an employee of the recipient, and Title IX investigators and decision-makers, who may be a recipient’s employees or the employees of a third-party, such as a consortium of schools) to review and investigate allegations of misconduct that fall outside the scope of Title IX. Similarly, the Rule does not preclude a recipient from using a grievance process that complies with § 106.45 with respect to allegations that fall outside the scope of Title IX. In the Preamble to the Rule at pages 481-82, for example, the Department states:

In response to commenters’ concerns, the final regulations revise § 106.45(b)(3)(i) to clearly state that dismissal for Title IX purposes does not preclude action under another provision of the recipient’s code of conduct. Thus, if a recipient is required under State law or the recipient’s own policies to investigate sexual or other misconduct that does not meet the § 106.30 definition, the final regulations clarify that a recipient may do so. Similarly, if a recipient wishes to use a grievance process that complies with § 106.45 to resolve allegations of misconduct that do not constitute sexual harassment under § 106.30, nothing in the final regulations precludes a recipient from doing so. Alternatively, a recipient may respond to non-Title IX misconduct under disciplinary procedures that do not comply with § 106.45. The final regulations leave recipients flexibility in this regard, and prescribe a particular grievance process only where allegations concern sexual harassment covered by Title IX.
The Definition of Sexual Harassment

**Question 4:** One form of sexual harassment is conduct on the basis of sex that constitutes “[u]nwelcome conduct determined by a reasonable person to be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person equal access to the recipient’s education program or activity.” In this sentence, does “reasonable person” modify only “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” only, or the effective denial clause as well? To clarify, can an “effective denial” be something that a reasonable person would experience, even if there is not evidence to show that the Complainant was in fact effectively denied?

**Answer 4:** The “reasonable person” standard in the second prong of the definition of sexual harassment under § 106.30(a) applies to each of the elements drawn from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed.*, 526 U.S. 629 (1999). These elements include: severity, pervasiveness, objective offensiveness, and the effective denial of equal educational access. In the Preamble to the Rule, at page 515, the Department states: “The *Davis* standard ensures that all students, employees, and recipients understand that unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex is actionable under Title IX when a reasonable person in the complainant’s position would find the conduct severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive such that it effectively denies equal access to the recipient’s education program or activity.”

With respect to the denial of the equal access element in particular, in the Preamble to the Title IX Rule, at page 525, states:

> Neither the Supreme Court, nor the final regulations in § 106.30, requires showing that a complainant dropped out of school, failed a class, had a panic attack, or otherwise reached a “breaking point” in order to report and receive a recipient’s supportive response to sexual harassment. The Department acknowledges that individuals react to sexual harassment in a wide variety of ways, and does not interpret the *Davis* standard to require certain manifestations of trauma or a “constructive expulsion.” Evaluating whether a reasonable person in the complainant’s position would deem the alleged harassment to deny a person “equal access” to education protects complainants against school officials inappropriately judging how a complainant has reacted to the sexual harassment. The § 106.30 definition neither requires nor permits school officials to impose notions of what a “perfect victim” does or says, nor may a recipient refuse to respond to sexual harassment because a complainant is “high-functioning” or not showing particular symptoms following a sexual harassment incident.

Similarly, the Preamble to the Title IX Rule, at pages 526-27, states:

> With respect to the denial of equal access element, neither the *Davis* Court nor the Department’s final regulations require complete exclusion from an education, but rather denial of “equal” access. Signs of enduring *unequal* educational access due to severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive sexual harassment may include, as commenters suggest, skipping class to avoid a harasser, a decline in a student’s
grade point average, or having difficulty concentrating in class; however, no concrete injury is required to conclude that serious harassment would deprive a reasonable person in the complainant’s position of the ability to access the recipient’s education program or activity on an equal basis with persons who are not suffering such harassment.

(emphasis added).

Filing of a Formal Complaint

**Question 5:** The Title IX Rule states: “At the time of filing a formal complaint, a complainant must be participating in or attempting to participate in the education program or activity of the school with which the formal complaint is filed.” If a complainant either withdraws from school because of sexual harassment and then files a complaint, or files a complaint but then withdraws as a result of the sexual harassment or stress of the grievance process, how would the regulations affect the complainant’s ability to pursue a formal complaint?

**Answer 5:** Under the Title IX Rule, recipients must promptly respond to a report that an individual has been allegedly victimized by sexual harassment, whether the alleged victim is presently a student or not, in a manner that is not “deliberately indifferent,” or clearly unreasonable in light of known circumstances. Students and others who are participating or attempting to participate in the school’s program or activity also have the right to file a formal complaint.

In the Preamble to the Title IX Rule, at pages 411-12, the Department further explains:

A complainant who has graduated may still be ‘attempting to participate’ in the recipient’s education program or activity; for example, where the complainant has graduated from one program but intends to apply to a different program, or where the graduated complainant intends to remain involved with a recipient’s alumni programs and activities. Similarly, a complainant who is on a leave of absence may be ‘participating or attempting to participate’ in the recipient’s education program or activity; for example, such a complainant may still be enrolled as a student even while on leave of absence, or may intend to re-apply after a leave of absence and thus is still ‘attempting to participate’ even while on a leave of absence. By way of further example, a complainant who has left school because of sexual harassment, but expresses a desire to re-enroll if the recipient appropriately responds to the sexual harassment, is ‘attempting to participate’ in the recipient’s education program or activity.

(emphasis added). Additionally, the Rule permits Title IX Coordinators to sign a formal complaint, regardless of whether a complainant is “participating or attempting to participate” in the school’s education program or activity. A Title IX Coordinator’s decision to sign a formal complaint (or not) is evaluated under the deliberate indifference standard: whether the decision was clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.
Conducting an Investigation Hearing

Question 6: May a recipient delegate many of the functions required by the Title IX Rule to an outside entity, such as a Regional Center or consortium of schools?

Answer 6: Yes. In particular, many of the elements of the investigation and hearing processes lend themselves to delegation. The recipient itself remains ultimately responsible for ensuring compliance with the legal obligations under the Title IX Rule.

At page 273 of the Preamble to the Title IX Rule, the Department expressly contemplates and encourages recipients to consider innovative approaches such as consortiums and regional centers:

The Department appreciates commenters’ recommendations for using regional center models and similar models involving voluntary, cooperative efforts among recipients to outsource the investigation and adjudication functions required under the final regulations. The Department believes these models represent the potential for innovation with respect to how recipients might best fulfill the obligation to impartially reach accurate factual determinations while treating both parties fairly. The Department encourages recipients to consider innovative solutions to the challenges presented by the legal obligation for recipients to fairly and impartially investigate and adjudicate these difficult cases, and the Department will provide technical assistance for recipients with questions about pursuing regional center models.

To be sure, there are limitations on the extent to which a recipient may delegate certain responsibilities to other entities. For instance, each recipient must itself employ a Title IX Coordinator. See § 106.8 (“Each recipient must designate and authorize at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with its responsibilities under this part, which employee must be referred to as the “Title IX Coordinator.”). Similarly, each recipient is responsible for ensuring that its grievance procedures satisfy the Title IX Rule. See § 106.44(c) (“A recipient must adopt and publish grievance procedures that provide for the prompt and equitable resolution of student and employee complaints alleging any action that would be prohibited by this part and a grievance process that complies with § 106.45 for formal complaints as defined in § 106.30”). Still, despite these limitations, the Title IX Rule offers ample opportunity for recipients to find efficiencies in cooperation with other recipients, particularly with respect to investigation and adjudication.

Question 7: What are the rules of evidence at a hearing? Do courtroom rules like the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to a hearing under Title IX?

Answer 7: The Title IX Rule does not adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence for hearings conducted under Title IX. For instance, with respect to which evidence may be introduced, the Rule uses “relevance” as the sole admissibility criterion. See § 106.45(b)(1)(ii) (the recipient’s grievance process must provide for objective evaluation of all relevant evidence, including evidence that is inculpatory and exculpatory).

The Title IX Rule also deems certain evidence and information to be not relevant or otherwise precludes the recipient from using it: (i) a party’s treatment records, without the party’s prior
written consent [§ 106.45(b)(5)(i)]; (ii) information protected by a legally recognized privilege [§ 106.45(b)(1)(x)]; (iii) questions or evidence about a complainant’s sexual predisposition, and questions or evidence about a complainant’s prior sexual behavior unless it meets one of two limited exceptions [§ 106.45(b)(6)(i)-(ii)]; and, for postsecondary institutions, the decision-maker cannot rely on the statements of a party or witness who does not submit to cross-examination [§ 106.45(b)(6)(i)].

In the Preamble to the Title IX Rule, at pages 980-82, the Department explains:

These final regulations require objective evaluation of relevant evidence, and contain several provisions specifying types of evidence deemed irrelevant or excluded from consideration in a grievance process; a recipient may not adopt evidentiary rules of admissibility that contravene those evidentiary requirements prescribed under § 106.45. For example, a recipient may not adopt a rule excluding relevant evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; although such a rule is part of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence constitute a complex, comprehensive set of evidentiary rules and exceptions designed to be applied by judges and lawyers, while Title IX grievance processes are not court trials and are expected to be overseen by layperson officials of a school, college, or university rather than by a judge or lawyer. Similarly, a recipient may not adopt rules excluding certain types of relevant evidence (e.g., lie detector test results, or rape kits) where the type of evidence is not either deemed “not relevant” (as is, for instance, evidence concerning a complainant’s prior sexual history) or otherwise barred from use under § 106.45 (as is, for instance, information protected by a legally recognized privilege). However, the § 106.45 grievance process does not prescribe rules governing how admissible, relevant evidence must be evaluated for weight or credibility by a recipient’s decision-maker, and recipients thus have discretion to adopt and apply rules in that regard, so long as such rules do not conflict with § 106.45 and apply equally to both parties.

**Question 8:** Do recipients have latitude to define relevance on their own?

**Answer 8:** In the Preamble to the Title IX Rule, at page 811, footnote 1018, the Department states: “The final regulations do not define relevance, and the ordinary meaning of the word should be understood and applied.” At page 812 of the Preamble, the Department states:

Relevance is the standard that these final regulations require, and any evidentiary rules that a recipient chooses must respect this standard of relevance. For example, a recipient may not adopt a rule excluding relevant evidence because such relevant evidence may be unduly prejudicial, concern prior bad acts, or constitute character evidence. A recipient may adopt rules of order or decorum to forbid badgering a witness, and may fairly deem repetition of the same question to be irrelevant.
However, there is a difference between the admission of relevant evidence, and the weight, credibility, or persuasiveness of particular evidence. At pages 981-82 of the Preamble, the Department further explains:

However, the § 106.45 grievance process does not prescribe rules governing how admissible, relevant evidence must be evaluated for weight or credibility by a recipient’s decision-maker, and recipients thus have discretion to adopt and apply rules in that regard, so long as such rules do not conflict with § 106.45 and apply equally to both parties. In response to commenters’ concerns that the final regulations do not specify rules about evaluation of evidence, and recognizing that recipients therefore have discretion to adopt rules not otherwise prohibited under § 106.45, the final regulations acknowledge this reality by adding language to the introductory sentence of § 106.45(b): “Any provisions, rules, or practices other than those required by § 106.45 that a recipient adopts as part of its grievance process for handling formal complaints of sexual harassment, as defined in § 106.30, must apply equally to both parties.” A recipient may, for example, adopt a rule regarding the weight or credibility (but not the admissibility) that a decision-maker should assign to evidence of a party’s prior bad acts, so long as such a rule applied equally to the prior bad acts of complainants and the prior bad acts of respondents. Because a recipient’s investigators and decision-makers must be trained specifically with respect to “issues of relevance,” any rules adopted by a recipient in this regard should be reflected in the recipient’s training materials, which must be publicly available.

(emphasis added) (internal footnotes omitted).

**Question 9:** The Title IX Rule states that at the postsecondary level, if a party does not appear at a live hearing, or chooses to not answer cross examination questions, that party’s statement must not be relied upon “in reaching a determination regarding responsibility.” If a complainant opts not to answer cross-examination questions, how does that impact that complainant’s statements in an investigative report? Does it mean all statements provided by that party before the hearing—including statements made to an investigator and summarized in the investigation report—are excluded?

**Answer 9:** The Title IX Rule, at § 106.45(b)(6)(i), requires postsecondary institutions to hold a live hearing with the opportunity for each party’s advisor to conduct cross-examination of parties and witnesses.

At page 1179 of the Preamble to the Rule, the Department explains:

Because party and witness statements so often raise credibility questions in the context of sexual harassment allegations, *the decision-maker must consider only those statements that have benefited from the truth-seeking function of cross-examination.* The recipient, and the parties, have equal opportunity (and, for the recipient, the obligation) to gather and present relevant evidence including fact and expert witnesses, and face the same limitations inherent in a lack of subpoena power.
to compel witness testimony. The Department believes that the final regulations, including § 106.45(b)(6)(i), strike the appropriate balance for a postsecondary institution context between ensuring that only relevant and reliable evidence is considered while not over-legalizing the grievance process.

(emphasis added). And at page 1181 of the Preamble to the Title IX Rule, the Department states:

The prohibition on reliance on “statements” applies not only to statements made during the hearing, but also to any statement of the party or witness who does not submit to cross-examination. “Statements” has its ordinary meaning, but would not include evidence (such as videos) that do not constitute a person’s intent to make factual assertions, or to the extent that such evidence does not contain a person’s statements. Thus, police reports, SANE reports, medical reports, and other documents and records may not be relied on to the extent that they contain the statements of a party or witness who has not submitted to cross-examination. While documentary evidence such as police reports or hospital records may have been gathered during investigation and, if directly related to the allegations inspected and reviewed by the parties, and to the extent they are relevant, summarized in the investigative report, the hearing is the parties’ first opportunity to argue to the decision-maker about the credibility and implications of such evidence. Probing the credibility and reliability of statements asserted by witnesses contained in such evidence requires the parties to have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses making the statements.

(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). For a further discussion of this topic and how it relates to unprotected speech that itself constitutes sexual harassment under the Title IX Rule, readers are invited to review OCR’s blog post on this topic here.

**Question 10:** When a post-secondary institution holds a live hearing, is the questioning limited to certain subjects?

**Answer 10:** The Rule requires that schools provide the opportunity for cross-examination, and that party advisors must be permitted to ask all relevant questions (including follow-up questions), and only relevant questions.

**Question 11:** At the postsecondary level, are party advisors expected to cross-examine witnesses?

**Answer 11:** The Title IX Rule, at § 106.45(b)(6)(i), states that a postsecondary institution must hold a live hearing. At the hearing, each party’s advisor of choice must be “permitted” to cross-examine witnesses. (Note that the same provision requires the recipient to provide a party with an advisor of the recipient’s choice, if the party appears at the hearing without an advisor of the party’s choice.)

**Question 12:** If a party’s advisor fails to cross-examine another party on a key statement related to credibility, what is the effect of this on the statement made by the complainant? May the decision-maker consider the key statement?
**Answer 12:** The Title IX Rule, in § 106.45(b)(6)(i), states: “At the live hearing, the decision-maker(s) must permit each party’s advisor to ask the other party and any witnesses all relevant questions and follow-up questions, including those challenging credibility.”

In the Preamble to the Rule at page 1181, the Department states (emphasis added):

Probing the credibility and reliability of statements asserted by witnesses contained in such evidence requires the parties to have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses making the statements.

The Department appreciates the opportunity to clarify here that to “submit to cross-examination” means answering those cross-examination questions that are relevant; the decision-maker is required to make relevance determinations regarding cross-examination in real time during the hearing in part to ensure that parties and witnesses do not feel compelled to answer irrelevant questions for fear of their statements being excluded.

(emphasis added).

Thus, the decision-maker is obligated to “permit” each party’s advisor to ask all relevant questions. However, this provision provides only an “opportunity” for each party (through an advisor) to conduct cross-examination; this provision does not purport to require that each party conduct cross-examination or will conduct cross-examination to the fullest extent possible. If a party chooses not to conduct cross-examination of another party or witness, that other party or witness cannot “submit” or “not submit” to cross-examination. Accordingly, the decision-maker is not precluded from relying on any statement of the party or witness who was not given the opportunity to submit to cross-examination. The same is true if a party’s advisor asks some cross-examination questions but not every possible cross-examination question; as to cross-examination questions not asked of a party or witness, that party or witness cannot be said to have submitted or not submitted to cross-examination, so the decision-maker is not precluded from relying on that party’s or witness’s statements.

Conversely, if a party or witness answers one, or some, but not all, relevant cross-examination questions asked by a party’s advisor at the live hearing, then that party or witness has not submitted to cross-examination and that party’s or witness’s statements cannot be relied on by the decision-maker. See Preamble at page 1183 (“the Department declines to allow a party or witness to “waive” a question because such a rule would circumvent the benefits and purposes of cross-examination as a truth-seeking tool for postsecondary institutions’ Title IX adjudications”).

**Question 13:** Does an advisor or party have an opportunity to provide input about how evidence should be weighted by the decision-maker?

**Answer 13:** Yes. The parties must have an equal opportunity to inspect, review, and respond to evidence directly related to the allegations (see § 106.45(b)(5)(vi)), and an equal opportunity to review and respond to the recipient’s investigative report (see § 106.45(b)(5)(vii)), allows each party the opportunity to provide input and make arguments about the relevance of evidence and
how a decision-maker should weigh the evidence. In the Preamble to the Rule at p. 1015, the Department states that the Rule:

... balances the recipient’s obligation to impartially gather and objectively evaluate all relevant evidence, including inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, with the parties’ equal right to participate in furthering each party’s own interests by identifying evidence overlooked by the investigator and evidence the investigator erroneously deemed relevant or irrelevant and making arguments to the decision-maker regarding the relevance of evidence and the weight or credibility of relevant evidence.

Note that Sections 106.45(b)(5)(vi) and (vii) require the recipient to “send to each party and the party’s advisor, if any” the evidence and the investigative report, so that a party’s advisor can advise the party in exercising the party’s right to review and respond to the evidence and to the investigative report.

**Question 14:** Are all witnesses expected to appear at a hearing, or do decision-makers have the flexibility to request witnesses as they deem necessary?

**Answer 14:** The Title IX Rule does not require that all witnesses appear at a hearing, although it does provide the parties an equal right to present witnesses. At page 1176 of the Preamble of the Title IX Rule, the Department acknowledges that recipients do not have subpoena powers to compel attendance of parties or witnesses at a hearing:

The Department understands that complainants (and respondents) often will not have control over whether witnesses appear and are cross-examined, because neither the recipient nor the parties have subpoena power to compel appearance of witnesses. Some absences of witnesses can be avoided by a recipient thoughtfully working with witnesses regarding scheduling of a hearing, and taking advantage of the discretion to permit witnesses to testify remotely.

Furthermore, § 106.71(a) protects parties and witnesses against retaliation for deciding to participate or not to participate in a Title IX grievance process. Thus, a witness cannot be compelled to appear at a hearing, and cannot be intimidated, threatened, coerced, or discriminated against if the witness chooses not to appear. However, the parties must have an equal opportunity to “present” witnesses, so the decision-maker cannot request the presence only of witnesses the decision-maker has deemed necessary. The decision-maker has discretion to permit witnesses to testify at the hearing remotely, using technology. See § 106.45(b)(6)(i).

**Question 15:** Some recipients divide hearings between a “responsibility” phase and a “sanctions” phase. Is that bifurcation possible under Title IX?

**Answer 15:** Yes. The Rule does not preclude a recipient from using one decision-maker to reach the determination regarding responsibility, and having another decision-maker determine appropriate remedies or a complainant or appropriate disciplinary sanctions for the respondent. However, the end result must be that the written determination regarding responsibility includes
the remedies and disciplinary sanctions decided upon in the written determination issued under § 106.45(b)(7).

That provision, at § 106.45(b)(7), requires a recipient’s decision-maker(s) to issue a written determination that must include, among other items, the result as to each allegation and rationale for the result, any disciplinary sanctions imposed by the recipient against the respondent, and whether remedies will be provided by the recipient to the complainant. The issuance of a written determination cannot be a piecemeal process that is broken down into chronologically occurring sub-parts.

Recipients should also remain aware of their obligation to conclude the grievance process within the reasonably prompt time frames designated in the recipient’s grievance process, under § 106.45(b)(1)(v). Additionally, each decision-maker—whether an employee of the recipient or an employee of a third party such as a consortium of schools—owes an individual and ongoing duty not have a conflict of interest or bias for or against complainants or respondents generally, or with respect to an individual complainant or respondent, pursuant to § 106.45(b)(1)(iii).

If you have questions for the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), want additional information or technical assistance, or believe that a school is violating federal civil rights law, visit OCR’s website at www.ed.gov/ocr, or the Department’s Title IX page at www.ed.gov/titleix. You may contact OCR at (800) 421-3481 (TDD: 800-877-8339), ocr@ed.gov, or contact OCR’s Outreach, Prevention, Education and Non-discrimination (OPEN) Center at OPEN@ed.gov, or e-mail the OPEN Center with additional questions about the Title IX Final Rule at T9questions@ed.gov. Additional information regarding the Title IX Final Rule is available here. You may also fill out a complaint form online at https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/complaintintro.html.